In Conversation: Captain Raul (Pete) A. Pedrozo, JAGC, USN (Ret.), Howard S. Levie Chair on the Law of Armed Conflict/Professor of International Law, U.S. Naval War College

Introduction

Contemporary maritime security disputes increasingly involve hybrid tactics, contested sovereignty, and the strategic manipulation of legal ambiguity through coast-guard enforcement, maritime militias, and grey-zone operations. These developments test the resilience of UNCLOS’s navigational freedoms, the stability of maritime boundary doctrines, and the limits of lawful maritime enforcement. As tensions rise in regions such as the South China Sea, Black Sea and Persian Gulf, the coherence of the normative framework governing naval activities and maritime security is being reevaluated.

To explore these themes, SPIL Mumbai engages in a conversation with Captain. Raul Pedrozo, Howard S. Levie Chair on the Law of Armed Conflict/Professor of International Law, U.S. Naval War College, Stockton Center for International Law, whose work has shaped contemporary interpretations of maritime security law. His extensive writing on naval operations, sovereignty disputes, and rules governing maritime force provides a unique vantage point for addressing the evolving maritime security landscape.

The Q&A is curated by Lavanya Hajare for the SPIL Blog.

1. To begin, Grey-zone operations employing maritime militias, disguised law-enforcement assets and civilian vessels blur the legal distinction between military and non-military actors. How should the law of naval operations classify such units for purposes of attribution, permissible response, and the application of rules governing the use of force at sea?

Generally, gray zone operations are coercive or provocative activities conducted by rogue States or non-State actors that fall below the threshold of the use of force warranting a military response in self-defense by the aggrieved State. Continued acceptance of the gray zone concept by the international community undermines deterrence and facilitates and encourages revisionist States to engage in aggressive behavior to change the status quo and undermine the rule of law. As such, the international community should consider eliminating “gray zone” from the lexicon of international relations.

The concept of gray zone operations is rooted in the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) dubious decisions in Nicaragua v. United States^[1] and the Oil Platform case.^[2] These cases held that in determining whether the use of force in self-defense is legally justified, it is necessary to distinguish the most grave forms of the use of force from other less grave forms—the “Gap Theory.” Accordingly, the ICJ held that a State may only exercise its right of self-defense against the “most grave” forms of the use of force—those constituting an “armed attack.”

Not all States, including the United States, subscribe to the ICJ’s “Gap Theory.” These States consider that customary international law allows States to exercise the right of self-defense against any illegal use of force.^[3] By requiring that “an attack reach a certain level of gravity” before the right of self-defense is triggered, States can exploit the “gap” by engaging in malign activities that fall below the threshold of an “armed attack,” anticipating that they can engage in gray zone operations with impunity without being subject to a decisive military response.^[4] 

Even if a State accepts the “Gap Theory,” it must consider that some gray zone activities may rise to the level of an armed attack thereby justifying a kinetic response in self-defense. A water cannon, for example, is normally considered a non-lethal weapon and is routinely used at sea by coast guards and naval units to conduct legitimate maritime law enforcement operations. However, depending on how they are used, high-pressure, high-volume waters cannons can cause significant property damage or severe injury or death.^[5] Similarly, ramming has been historically used as a means of warfare for millennia. Ships, fitted with hardened and reinforced hulls or a bow prolongation, are intentionally steered directly into another vessel to damage or sink it. The Sansha People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM), for example, operates more than 80 ships equipped with water cannons and fitted with reinforced steel hulls purpose-built for ramming other vessels.^[6] If use of a water cannon or intentional ramming cause significant property damage or serious injury or death, it should be considered a grave use of force that authorizes a kinetic response in self-defense by the aggrieved State.^[7]

For purposes of attribution, States incur responsibility for their internationally wrongful acts.^[8] An internationally wrongful act occurs when an act or omission is attributable to a State under international law and constitutes a breach of an international obligation of that State.^[9] A State breaches its international obligations when an act of that State does not conform to what is required by those obligations.^[10] Moreover, the conduct of any State organ, such as the China Coast Guard (CCG), is considered the act of that State under international law.^[11]

Similarly, the conduct of an entity that is not an organ of the State but is empowered by that State to exercise elements of governmental authority, like the PAFMM, is considered an act of the State under international law.^[12] Additionally, the conduct of a group, like the PAFMM, is considered an act of a State under international law if that group is, in fact, acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.^[13] The PAFMM is trained and equipped to provide paramilitary support to the CCG and the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) in times of peace and war. As part of the People’s Armed Forces, the PAFMM is under the direct command and control of local PLA military commanders and can be integrated into the PLAN or CCG to support forward deployed forces and defend Chinese interests.^[14] Therefore, any official acts committed by the CCG and PAFMM to project China’s illegal maritime and sovereignty claims in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea are attributable to China.

China’s aggressive maritime law enforcement activities—e.g., ramming, shouldering, use of water cannons, blocking maneuvers, interference with coastal State resource rights, seizing fishing gear and catch, illegally asserting law enforcement authority in foreign territorial seas and exclusive economic zones (EEZ), illegally exercising jurisdiction over foreign-flagged vessels beyond its territorial sea, and violating coastal State sovereignty and sovereign rights—have been adjudicated by an international tribunal and found to violate China’s treaty obligations^[15] under the Collision Regulations^[16] and Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS).^[17] China incurs state responsibility for these internationally wrongful acts.

Aggrieved States may therefore take lawful countermeasures against China to induce Beijing to comply with its obligations under international law.^[18] As the responsible State, China is under an obligation to make full reparation for any injury caused by its internationally wrongful acts.^[19] Full reparation includes restitution, compensation, and/or satisfaction.^[20] Restitution requires that China re-establish the situation that existed before the wrongful act was committed.^[21] If China is unable to make restitution or if restitution is insufficient to correct the injuries suffered by an aggrieved State, Chian has a legal obligation to pay compensation for the injuries caused by its internationally wrongful acts, including any financially assessable damages.^[22] China may also be required to pay interest on any principal sum due, if necessary, to ensure full reparation, which accrues from the date the principal sum should have been paid until the date the obligation is paid in full.^[23] China should also be required to give satisfaction for its misdeeds—an acknowledgement that it breached its international obligations under UNCLOS and COLREGS, and a formal apology to the coastal States concerned.^[24]

Countermeasures may not involve the use of force and must be commensurate with the injury suffered, the gravity of the international wrongful act, and the rights of the injured State being violated.^[25] Thus, use of non-lethal technologies that fall below the use of force threshold—e.g., water cannons, dazzle guns, active denial systems, long-range acoustic devices, boat traps, and liquid deterrent systems—would be appropriate countermeasures to convince China to comply with its international obligations. Even if the use of these technologies by an aggrieved State would be prohibited under normal circumstances, to the extent that the use of non-lethal technologies constitutes a lawful countermeasure, it would not be precluded by international law.^[26]

Use of non-lethal technologies as a countermeasure to convince China to curtail its unlawful conduct will demonstrate the unwavering commitment of Asian States to a stable, rules-based legal regime for the world’s oceans, as well as preserve their sovereignty and sovereign rights and uphold their ability to use the world’s oceans free of Chinese coercion. By closing “The Gap” using more assertive counter gray zone operations, States will be better positioned to convince China to desist from engaging in provocative actions and comply with its international obligations under COLREGS and UNCLOS.^[27]

States like Iran and China are also using civilian vessels to engage in activities that would normally be carried out my military vessels. For example, Iran maintains a forward presence of state-owned commercial merchant ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden that serve as auxiliary intelligence ships (e.g., M/V Saviz and M/V Behshad).^[28] These vessels collect intelligence on international shipping and disseminate that information to Houthi rebels in Yemen and other Iranian proxies throughout the Middle East to facilitate targeting of international shipping off the Arabian Peninsula.^[29] During an international armed conflict merchant vessels that make an effective contribution to military action or exercise belligerent rights on behalf of the enemy becomes a military objective and liable to capture or attack. Activities considered to make an effective contribution to military action or the exercise of a belligerent right on behalf of the enemy include (inter alia) gathering intelligence or providing targeting data and being incorporated into or assisting the enemy’s intelligence or military data-gathering systems.^[30]

Similarly, China is integrating civilian vessels into its war plans to directly support PLAN operations. A 2016 Chinese law requires civilian shipping companies to (inter alia) directly support military operations.^[31] Over 30 civilian roll-on roll-off (RORO) ferries have been modified to augment the PLAN’s amphibious assault force in support of an amphibious assault on Taiwan.^[32] China also intends to surreptitiously deploy Club-K (CSDCS) missile systems on board commercial container ships to conduct a crippling first strike against enemy targets in the event of a war in the Pacific.^[33] China’s large merchant fleet (5,600-plus vessels) provides the PLAN with unlimited launch platforms.^[34] Finally, as mentioned above, China will use PAFMM fishing vessels in direct support of PLAN operations during an armed conflict. Using an otherwise civilian vessel to engage in belligerent acts—e.g., provide targeting data or collect intelligence, launch an attack, lay mines, transport troops or military equipment—makes the vessel a military objective that can be captured or attacked even though there are civilians on board.^[35] Use of civilian vessels in support of military operations is not new, but it blurs the distinction between a protected civilian object and a military objective that could result in inadvertent targeting of innocently employed merchant vessels.

2. Excessive maritime claims including straight baselines, unlawful EEZ restrictions, and domestic legislation asserting control over navigation challenge both UNCLOS and global FON operations. How should international law conceptualise enforcement responses to persistent unlawful claims when diplomatic protest and navigational assertion have proven insufficient?

In the late 1970s, the United States recognized that diplomatic protests were insufficient to counter the growing number of excessive maritime claims around the world. As a result, the Carter Administration instituted the U.S. Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program in 1979 to allow the Department of Defense to engage in tangible demonstrations of U.S. resolve regarding these claims.^[36] The program was reaffirmed by President Reagan in the 1983 U.S. Ocean Policy statement, which provides that the United States will not “acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight,” and that United States would “exercise and assert its rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests” reflected in UNCLOS.^[37] 

Excessive maritime claims attempt to unlawfully restrict freedoms of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea guaranteed to all nations under international law. If left unchallenged, these claims can infringe on the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea enjoyed by all nations. It is therefore in the interests of all States to challenge these unilateral and illegal claims. Unfortunately, the United States is the only nation to have a formal FON Program to globally challenge excessive claims.

A handful of States have recently joined the United States in challenging China’s excessive maritime claims in the South China Sea, recognizing that United States does not have the capacity to uphold the regional order by itself.^[38] Some States have also sent their warships through the Taiwan Strait to challenge China’s claims—Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.^[39] But there is no coordinated universal effort by like-minded States to challenge excessive maritime claims around the world. What is needed is a coordinated response by a coalition of nations that can unite to impose other measures (e.g., countermeasures, economic sanctions, etc.) should diplomatic protests and operational assertions fail to achieve the desired result.

As discussed above, aggrieved States can impose measures (short of use of force) that are normally prohibited under international law to the extent that the measure imposed constitutes a lawful countermeasure.^[40] For example, China is “zone locked.” For its ships to expeditiously reach the Western Pacific, they must pass through Japanese, Philippine, and Indonesian waters. Japan, the Philippines, and Indonesia could coordinate their efforts and restrict Chinese ships from engaging in innocent passage in their territorial seas and archipelagic waters, transit passage through international straits, and archipelagic sea lanes passage through archipelagic sea lanes as a lawful countermeasure for China’s continued violation of its international legal obligations under UNCLOS. South China Sea claimants, joined by Japan, Australia, India, and the United States could impose economic sanctions on China for its coercive and provocative behavior in the South China Sea. Of course, none of these measures would be easy to impose given China’s capacity to respond militarily and economically to preserve their freedom of access to the Western Pacific and excessive claims in the South China Sea.

China is extremely sensitive to being exposed publicly for its numerous indiscretions, preferring instead to negotiate its maritime disputes bilaterally with the States concerned. Like-minded States could therefore exploit this insecurity by playing the “name and shame game” at international fora. For example, CCG and PAFMM vessels engaged in purported maritime law enforcement and forward presence operations routinely violate their obligations under COLREGS and UNCLOS, as reflected in the South China Sea Arbitration Award.^[41] As the flag State, China is responsible for these violations.^[42] A coalition of States could submit an information paper at the annual meeting of the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee and the annual meeting of the States Parties to UNCLOS cataloging, in detail, each violation of COLREGS, UNCLOS, and other international treaties (such as the Safety of Life at Sea Convention) committed by the CCG and PAFMM.

Similarly, China is the worst performing nation in the world in combating illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing for the fifth year in a row.^[43] Distant Water Fishing Fleets (DWFF) are closely associated with IUU fishing due to minimal oversight or intentionally complicit management by the flag States. This is particularly true for China’s DWFF, the largest in the world (nearly 12,500 operating outside Chinese waters).^[44] China’s fleet is “bigger than the next four largest fishing countries combined,” accounting for fifty percent of the global fishing effort^[45] and has significantly expanded its global fishing footprint, operating in the Atlantic, Indian, Southern, and Pacific Oceans, as well as the Yellow, South China, and East China Seas.^[46] China’s continued disregard for the sovereign rights of other nations in their EEZs threatens the stability of States that depend “on marine resources for food security and economic development.”^[47] China is faltering in its responsibility as a flag State to correct this illicit behavior.^[48] China’s indiscretions and those of its DWFF should be reported by a coalition of aggrieved States at the biennial meeting of Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization.

3. Coast-guard forces increasingly undertake operations traditionally associated with navies, raising complex legal questions about status, immunities and permissible actions. Should international law develop clearer criteria distinguishing naval operations from law-enforcement operations, particularly where coast-guards possess war-fighting capabilities?

There is no requirement or need to develop criteria to distinguish naval operations from law enforcement operations in peacetime. All these constabulary operations fall under the Maritime Security Operation (MSO) rubric and may be performed by any authorized government ship or aircraft (e.g., warship, Coast Guard vessel, maritime police vessel, etc.). For example, counter-piracy operations may only be  carried out by a warship or military aircraft, or other ship or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect.^[49] Similarly, the right of visit must be carried out by a warship or military aircraft, or any other duly authorized ship or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service.^[50]

In peacetime, warships and ships owned or operated by a State and used only on government non-commercial service shall, seaward of the territorial sea, have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State.^[51] The flag State bears international responsibility for any loss or damage to a coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship and other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State related to innocent passage through the territorial sea.^[52] This does not, however, affect the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes.^[53]

As discussed in more detail in question 4 below, any force used by a warship or Coast Guard vessel, while engaged in peacetime maritime law enforcement operations, must be reasonable and necessary under the circumstances. Even in situations where the Security Council has taken action under Chapter VII, use of force by participating nations is normally limited by the Security Council resolution. For example, the resolution imposing a naval blockade on Iraq in 1990 limited participating naval forces “to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping . . . .”^[54]

In times of war, belligerent Coast Guard vessels (like warships and naval auxiliaries) are military objectives by their “nature” and may be attack at any time outside neutral waters.^[55] An exception exists for Coast Guard coastal rescue craft. Rescue craft must not be attacked or captured and must be allowed (subject to some limited exceptions) to perform their humanitarian functions. These craft lose their special protection if they commit or are used to commit, outside their humanitarian tasks, acts harmful to the enemy.^[56]

4. The use of non-lethal weapons, high-power water cannons, acoustic devices, and ramming tactics has become common in maritime confrontations. How should existing rules on the use of force at sea incorporate these intermediate measures, which do not fit neatly within classical understandings of armed force or law-enforcement coercion?

Since 2007, non-lethal technologies have been deployed on merchant ships, primarily to prevent pirate attacks. Ships operating in areas experiencing high incidents of piracy or armed robbery at sea have been equipped with non-lethal technologies that can be employed by the crew to prevent pirates from boarding their ships.^[57] While some of these technologies are used by maritime law enforcement authorities to perform legitimate missions, they can also be used by malign States and non-State actors to engage in coercive gray zone operations.

Some of the more prominent devices include water cannons/high-pressure fire hoses; dazzle guns and laser devices; Active Denial System (electromagnetic wave); Long-Range Acoustic Devices (sonic weapons); nets and boat traps; and foul-smelling liquid (Liquid Deterrent Systems).

Non-lethal technologies can be used by Coast Guards and other maritime law enforcement authorities to execute their duties to the extent that their use is reasonable and necessary under the circumstances. This basic principle of international law on the use of force during maritime law enforcement operations is reflected in the decisions of international tribunals and numerous bilateral and multilateral treaties and arrangements and has been adopted in both domestic and international guidelines for the use of force in maritime law enforcement operations.

International agreements and arrangements that reflect the law enforcement use of force standard include the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement,^[58] the 2005 SUA Protocol,^[59] numerous^[60] bilateral agreements^[61] implementing the 1988 Vienna Drug Convention,^[62] and bilateral^[63] arrangements^[64] implementing the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).^[65]

Restrictions on the use of force reflected in these and other international treaties and instruments have their origin in judicial and arbitral decisions that prohibit indiscriminate and excessive use of force by maritime law enforcement officials. The four seminal cases that examine the use of force issues during maritime law enforcement operations are 1929 I’m Alone,^[66] 1961 Red Crusader,^[67] 1997 M/V Saiga,^[68] and 2014 M/V Virginia G.^[69]

            The United Nations has developed several non-binding guidelines on the use of force to assist law enforcement personnel in the performance of their duties. These guidelines adopt the “reasonable and necessary” standard and can be used by States as a guide to develop national use of force rules. Some of these guidelines include the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Personnel,^[70] the UN Principles on Use of Force,^[71] and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Maritime Crime Manual.^[72]

            Nonetheless, as discussed in question no. 1 above, if the use of a non-lethal technology causes or is anticipated to cause significant property damage or serious injury or death, kinetic force can be used in self-defense to counter the attack.

5. Maritime autonomy introduces novel challenges for naval law-of-war doctrine, particularly when autonomous vessels undertake ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) or close-in navigational assertions. How should command responsibility and rules of engagement evolve when decisions are partly delegated to algorithmic systems?

The use of unmanned maritime systems (UMS) is becoming more prevalent in peacetime as well as in times of war. Both Russia and Ukraine, for example, have extensively deployed UMS to conduct attacks on maritime and shore-based targets during their ongoing conflict in the Black Sea.^[73] 

In June 2023, the IMO’s MSC determined that a human master need not be physically on board a ship depending on the ship’s technology if the master has the means to intervene when necessary. Whether physically on board or not, the master remains responsible for the ship, regardless of its level of autonomy (i.e., remote-controlled, semi-autonomous, autonomous). MSC also agreed that UMSs could be remotely operated from a Remote Operations Center by qualified remote operators.^[74]

Numerous States have reached a similar conclusion regarding the designation of warships.^[75] Warships can include both manned and unmanned surface ships, submarines, and other submersibles that have been designated as a warship by the flag State and are included in the respective State’s list or registry of warships. There is no requirement that the commanding officer or crew be physically on board the warship. Warships may therefore be autonomous or remotely commanded, crewed, and operated by personnel ashore or on board a manned platform. An autonomous vessel that operates independently of human decision-making may still be under the command of an officer and manned by a crew serving on board another ship or ashore.^[76] Even if it is not designated as a warship, small UMSs that are launched from a surface warship or submarine may be considered an extension of the launch platform and may exercise belligerent rights and navigational freedoms enjoyed by the launch platform.^[77]

These positions are consistent with long-standing State practice and existing treaty law. Every sovereign State decides “to whom he will accord the right to fly his flag and to prescribe the rules governing such grants.”^[78] The same rule is reflected in article 91 of UNCLOS, which provides that “every State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag,” and provide documents to that effect.^[79] Thus, domestic, not international, law governs ship registration, and many States agree that a UMS can be designated a “ship” or “warship” under their national laws.

UMS—warships, naval auxiliaries, maritime devices, sensors, or weapons systems—enjoy sovereign immunity as government property. If designated a warship or naval auxiliary by the flag State, an UMS enjoys the same navigational rights and freedoms and other internationally lawful uses of the seas related to these freedoms as a manned platform.

UMS that have been designated as a warship or naval auxiliary must comply with the international law of the sea to the same extent that a manned platform must comply. Thus, if an UMS is conducting innocent passage through a foreign territorial sea, it may not engage in activities that are prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. Collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal State is a prohibited activity for ships engaged in innocent passage.^[80] The coastal State may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent.^[81] If discovered, the coastal State can order the UMS to cease the collection operation and if the UMS does not comply, the coastal State may order the UMS to immediately leave its territorial sea.^[82] Thus, an UMS that is going to exercise navigational rights and freedoms in the various maritime zones must have the capability to respond to coastal State queries. This can be accomplished through AI-enabled preplanned responses or by relaying the coastal State message back to the land- or sea-based remote operations center for an appropriate response from (and possible corrective action by) the commanding officer or crew (remote operators).

6. With increasing militarisation of disputed maritime zones, what legal standards should govern the deployment of naval vessels into contested waters, particularly where States claim such deployments are “provocative”, but freedom of navigation operations view them as essential for upholding international law?

Freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) are peacetime operations designed to exercise rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and airspace recognized under international law. FONOPS are conducted globally against a wide range of excessive maritime claims, without regard to current events of identity of the nations advancing the claims and are an important way to influence nations either to avoid new excessive claims or renounce existing ones. FONOPS are routinely conducted to excessive claims of allies, partners, competitors, and adversaries alike to maintain the FON Program’s legitimacy and demonstrate U.S. resolve to uphold navigational rights and freedoms guaranteed to all nations under UNCLOS and the Chicago Convention. FONOPS are intended to be nonprovocative and are deliberately planned, legally reviewed, properly approved by higher authority, and safely and professionally conducted in a non-escalatory manner.

If challenged, the ship or aircraft conducting the assertion will inform coastal State authorities that it is exercising navigational rights and freedoms consistent with international law. In most cases there is no further interaction with the coastal State, although there have been a few exceptions where coastal States authorities have responded more aggressively—e.g., Libya Line of Death Incident, Black Sea Bumping Incident, and EP-3 Incident.^[83] However, even in these cases, U.S. forces have not used force in self-defense (except in the case of Libya) and the matter has been resolved through diplomatic channels.

7. Maritime exclusion zones declared during armed conflict or heightened tension can impair neutral shipping. How should the law distinguish permissible precautionary zones from unlawful restrictions that effectively weaponise navigational space?

MEZs have been routinely employed during armed conflicts since the beginning of the twentieth century to control access to broad ocean areas and to shape battlespace management. Recent examples include the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) established by the United Kingdom (UK) during the Falklands/Malvinas War, the war zones declared by Iran and Iraq during the Tanker War, the Maritime Safey Zones (MSZ) established by the United States during the First and Second Gulf Wars, and the war zones declared by Russia in the Sea of Asov and the northwest portion of the Black Sea north of 45° 21’.^[84] Whether and to what extent these zones are consistent with the law of naval warfare depends on their function and the measures used by the belligerents to enforce them.^[85]

The war zones declared by Iran and Iraq during the Tanker War were “free fire zones” where no distinction was made between military objectives and protected vessels. Iraq indicated it would “attack all vessels” in the zone and that all tankers, regardless of flag, docking at Kharg Island would be considered legitimate targets.^[86] Likewise, Iran declared that all its waters were a war zone and that it would “bear no responsibility for merchant ships” entering the Persian Gulf and failing to comply with the routing instructions.^[87] 

Similarly, during the Falklands/Malvinas War, both Argentina and the UK declared legally questionable exclusion zones. Argentina threatened to attack any British vessel in its declared war zone, which extended to the entire South Atlantic.^[88] The UK TEZ applied to any military or civilian ship or aircraft, regardless of flag found within the TEZ without the permission of the UK Ministry of Defense. These vessels would “be regarded as operating in support of the illegal occupation” of the Falklands and would “be regarded as hostile” and liable to attack by British Forces.^[89]

The war zones established by Russia in February 2024 suspended navigation in the Sea of Azov and prohibited navigation in the northwest portion of the Black Sea north of 45° 21’ “due to counterterrorist operations carried out by the Russian Navy” and that any ship or vessel “in this area will be regarded as terrorist threats.”^[90] Both zones were, in effect, illegal “free fire” zones.

Compare these zones with the MSZ established by U.S. forces in the eastern Mediterranean Sea in March 2003 (HYDROLANT 597/03). The MSZ warned all ships that U.S. forces were “conducting combat operations in international waters that pose a hazard to navigation” and advised all ships to “remain clear” of the designated operation area. The declaration further advised all vessels to “maintain a safe distance from U.S. forces,” noting that any vessel entering the MSZ and approaching U.S. forces or whose intentions were unclear were subject to visit and search, and that vessels approaching U.S. forces should maintain radio contact via Channel 16. Non-compliance with these instructions would authorize “appropriate measures in self-defense if warranted by the circumstances.”^[91] The MSZ served as a warning to commercial shipping to stand clear of the immediate area of operations to reduce the risk of exposure to an inadvertent attack but made clear it was not a free fire zone and that self-defense measures would only be employed by U.S. forces “if warranted by the circumstances.”

            War zones can be used to warn neutral vessels and aircraft to avoid an area of naval operations to reduce the possibility that neutrals will ships and aircraft be mistakenly identified as a military objective and attacked.^[92] To the extent MEZs reduce exposure of neutral vessels and aircraft to collateral damage and incidental injury, and they do not unreasonably interfere with legitimate neutral commerce or create a “free fire zone,” they may be lawfully employed by the belligerents during an international armed conflict.^[93] 

An important point to remember is that neutral merchant ships and aircraft do not become a lawful target simply because they enter the war zone. Before attacking a ship or aircraft in the MEZ, belligerents must still ensure that the target is a military objective.^[94] Moreover, the extent, location, and duration of a MEZ and the measures used to enforce the zone should not exceed what is required for military necessity.^[95] The belligerents must also guarantee neutral vessels and aircraft safe passage through the MEZ if the zone significantly impedes free and safe access to neutral ports.^[96]

Regardless of their purpose, war zones must comply with the following requirements under the law of naval warfare: (1) notification—all aspects of the zone must be declared and notified to the international community (e.g., notice to mariners (NOTMAR) or notice to airmen (NOTAM); (2) enforcement—the same targeting law applies inside and outside the zone; a “free fire” zone of unrestricted warfare at sea is unlawful; and (3) minimize effects on neutrals—the zone must balance the military requirement for the zone against any impact it has on the rights of neutral navigation (e.g., zone in a remote sea area v. zone over a busy international shipping lane).^[97]

8. States increasingly invoke domestic security legislation to justify maritime interdictions far beyond accepted jurisdictional limits. How should international law address the expansion of domestic security prerogatives that undermine navigational freedoms but avoid formal disagreement with treaty law?

There may be limited situations where coastal States may elect to exercise prescriptive^[98] and enforcement^[99] jurisdiction over incidents that occur beyond their territorial sea. Such extraterritorial jurisdiction is based on the protective principle^[100] of international law. These situations, however, should be the exception, not the rule. An example of such an exceptional situation is the international damage to submarine cables and pipelines located beyond the territorial sea of any coastal State (hereinafter critical undersea infrastructure (CUI)). Although rare, intentional damage to CUI is on the rise. Moreover, the frequency of these incidents, as well as the suspected perpetrators (Russia and China), suggest that rogue States and non-State actors may be systematically targeting CUI intentionally.

Since 2023, there have been at least eleven incidents of sabotage to CUI in the Baltic Sea^[101] and four off the coast of Taiwan.^[102] CUI supports vital commercial, economic, and national security activities. They play a critical role in global communications, carrying 95 percent of intercontinental global internet traffic and 99 percent of transoceanic digital communications (e.g., internet), including trillions of dollars in international financial transactions daily.^[103] The security and resilience of CUI are, therefore, vital to worldwide information flows, commerce, scientific research, military communications, and national security.

Generally, State authority to protect submarine cables and pipelines is limited to the territorial sea and archipelagic waters.^[104] Beyond the territorial sea, States only have the authority (and obligation) to adopt laws and regulations that criminalize the willful (or culpable negligence) breaking or injury of a submarine cable beyond the territorial sea by ships flying their flag or by a person subject to their jurisdiction.^[105] 

India has found a novel way to fill the gap to provide for coastal State authority over intentional damage to its CUI beyond the territorial sea. Amendments to the Telecommunications Act of 2023^[106] extends the Act to “any offence committed or contravention made outside India by any person, as provided in this Act.”^[107] Section 22 of the Act allows the Central Government (by notification in the Official Gazette) to declare any telecommunication network as “Critical Telecommunication Infrastructure [CTI], disruption of which shall have debilitating impact on national security, economy, public health or safety.”^[108] Whoever damages CTI shall be imprisoned for not more than three years or fined  up to two crore rupees, or with both.^[109] Section 50 specifically provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction—“this Act shall apply to any offence committed or contravention made outside India by any person if the act or conduct constituting such offence or contravention involves a telecommunication service provided in India, or telecommunication equipment or telecommunication network located in India.”^[110] The Indian Coast Guard is authorized to “visit, board, search, and seize vessel, or arrest any person,…involved or suspected to be used or likely to be used in the commission of any offence punishable under any of the Central Acts … within the maritime zones of India extending up to the exclusive economic zone.”^[111]

9. Hybrid naval–coast guard operations raise issues of command structure, legal authority and operational attribution. Should there be a unified legal regime governing mixed maritime forces, or is fragmentation between naval warfare law and peacetime enforcement law inevitable?

There is no need to create a unified legal regime governing mixed maritime forces. As discussed in Question 3 above, Coast Guard and naval forces will conduct MSO in accordance with peacetime rules, as well as national laws and regulations regarding the use of force during peacetime operations.

During an international armed conflict, the law of naval warfare is lex specialis and will take precedence over peacetime rules that conflict or are inconsistent with the law of naval warfare. If the Coast Guard becomes part of the Navy during an international armed conflict, Coast Guard units will be guided by the law of naval warfare. For example, Coast Guard units could exercise the belligerent right of visit and search and board any neutral commercial ship to determine its true character (enemy or neutral) and the nature of its cargo (contraband or free goods). The peacetime principle of exclusive flag State jurisdiction on the high seas would not apply.^[112]

As discussed above (Q3), in times of war, even if they are not part of the Navy, belligerent Coast Guard vessels (like belligerent warships and naval auxiliaries) are military objectives by their “nature” and may be attack at any time outside neutral waters.^[113] The only exception is for Coast Guard coastal rescue craft, as previously discussed in Question 3.^[114]

10. The Black Sea conflict has intensified debates about whether certain maritime actions constitute “armed attacks” sufficient to trigger collective-defence obligations. How should the threshold be conceptualised when aggression occurs through sea mines, cyber interference with navigation systems or attacks on commercial vessels?

Sea mines are used for area denial, coastal and harbor defense, anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare, and blockade.^[115] Types of mines include moored, tethered, seabed, and controlled mines and are characterized as (1) contact or influence, (2) by location (moored, bottom, and floating), and (3) by mobility (self-propelled and fixed).^[116] 

Generally, sea mines are a permissible means of warfare if they can be lawfully employed—i.e., capable of use in accordance with the law of naval warfare, including the principle of distinction (capable of being directed at a military objective). The rules governing automatic submarine contact mines are contained in Hague VIII.^[117] The treaty prohibits the laying of “unanchored automatic contact mines, except when they are so constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after the person who laid them ceases to control them.”^[118] Additionally, it is forbidden to “lay anchored automatic contact mines which do not become harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings.”^[119]

In the case of the Black Sea conflict, both Russia and Ukraine have deployed over 400 automatic contact mines off the coast of Ukraine in 2022.^[120] Since then, there have been widespread reports of over 100 drifting mines in the Black Sea.^[121] It is impossible to say which side laid the drifting mines that are currently floating in the Black Sea, but the possibility exists that both sides may have violated their obligations under Hague VIII since the mines did not become harmless with the one hour timeframe specified in the treaty.

For purposes of the law of naval warfare, an attack is an act of violence against the adversary or other lawful target, whether in offense or defense.^[122] Although attacks are generally carried out by conventional, kinetic means (e.g., torpedo), they may also be carried out by non-kinetic means (e.g., cyber) if the effect is equivalent to that of a kinetic attack. In other words, the cyber-attack must result, or is designed to result, in damage, destruction, injury, or death.^[123] GPS spoofing of a ship’s location, however, would not qualify as an attack if it merely involves jamming. The use of cyber in this case would merely degrade the efficiency of the ship’s navigational system, without causing a kinetic effect.^[124] However, if GPS spoofing is intended to mislead the ship into a mine field and thus is expected to damage the ship physically, it would amount to an attack.^[125] Regardless of whether it is an attack or not, the use of cyber is permitted during an international armed conflict if it is directed at a military objective. GPS spoofing of a neutral merchant vessel would, therefore, violate the principle of distinction.

Rules regarding the targeting of merchant vessels, enemy or neutral, are reflected in customary international law. If an enemy merchant vessel engages in an activity that makes an effective contribution to military action or the exercise of any other belligerent right on behalf of the enemy, it becomes a military objective that is targetable. Such activities include: (1) engaging in belligerent acts (e.g., laying mines, providing targeting data), (2) engaging in activities otherwise performed by naval auxiliaries (e.g., transporting troops or military material), (3) being incorporated into or assisting the enemy’s intelligence or data gathering (e.g., conducting hydrographic survey or reconnaissance), (4) actively resisting visit, search, or capture; refusing an order to stop; or refusing to abide by military regulations imposed by a naval commander in the immediate area of naval operations; (5) sailing under convoy with enemy warships or military aircraft; (6)  being armed to an extent beyond that reasonably required to defend themselves; or (7) engaging (or intending to engage) in any other activity bringing them within the definition of a military objective (e.g., intentionally hampering the movement of enemy forces or shielding enemy warships).^[126]

Neutral merchant vessels may also be liable to attack if they engage in certain activities, including: (1) engaging in belligerent acts; (2) engaging in activities on behalf of the enemy otherwise performed by naval auxiliaries; (3) being incorporated into or assisting the enemy’s intelligence or military data-gathering systems; (4) actively resisting visit, search, or capture; refusing an order to stop; or refusing to abide by military regulations imposed by a naval commander; (5) sailing under convoy with enemy warships or military aircraft; or (6) engaging (or intending to engage) in any other activity bringing them within the definition of a military objective.^[127] 

11. Intelligence-gathering within EEZs remains contested despite widespread State practice supporting its legality. Should UNCLOS be interpreted dynamically to clarify the permissibility of ISR operations, or is ambiguity strategically useful for maintaining naval flexibility?

The law regarding the legality of intelligence-gathering at sea is clear, so there is no need to interpret UNCLOS dynamically to clarify the permissibility of ISR Operations. It is also important to understand that UNCLOS is not the sole reference to consider when determining the legality of peacetime intelligence-gathering beyond the territorial sea, particularly in international airspace. The Chicago Convention is also relevant, as is a century of State practice and decisions of the UN Security Council that clearly reflect that intelligence-gathering outside the territorial sea and in international airspace is permissible.

Coastal States exercise sovereignty in their territorial sea and national airspace.^[128] UNCLOS specifically prohibits intelligence collection by ships engaged in innocent passage through the territorial sea.^[129] And the Chicago Convention prohibits state aircraft from entering national airspace without coastal State authorization.^[130] Similar restrictions do not appear in the contiguous zone, EEZ, or high seas provisions of either convention. Thus, intelligence collection beyond the territorial sea and national airspace is permissible under UNCLOS and the Chicago Convention. This conclusion is supported by decisions of the Security Council during the Cold War and over a hundred years of State practice.

UNCLOS does not provide coastal States any authority in international airspace above the contiguous zone or EEZ. Thus, States claiming authority to regulate ISR and other military activities in international airspace based on UNCLOS are clearly acting ultra vires. Efforts at International Civil Aviation Organization to designate the airspace above the EEZ as national airspace were rejected by the ICAO Legal Committee, indicating the proposal would flagrantly contradict “the relevant provisions of UNCLOS which equate the EEZ . . . with the high seas as regards freedom of over flight.”^[131]

Coastal States do have limited authority in international airspace to provide air traffic services to commercial aircraft in a flight information region (FIR) that has been established pursuant to a regional air navigation agreement approved by the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).^[132] However, FIR rules and procedures do not apply to State aircraft, including military aircraft, as a matter of international law.^[133]

During the Cold War, over forty U.S. reconnaissance aircraft were shot down in the European and Pacific regions between 1945 and 1977.^[134] These attacks were justified on the grounds that the aircraft had violated national airspace.^[135] During the 1950s and 1960s, the Security Council discussed the issue of aerial reconnaissance following several incidents between U.S. and Soviet aircraft. In response to a question regarding whether surveillance aircraft could be attacked over the high seas, the Soviet representative rejected the position that coastal States had the right to interfere with intelligence collection activities in international airspace.^[136] The UK delegate similarly indicated without objection from any other member of the Security Council that aerial surveillance directed at a coastal State from international airspace was consistent with international law and the UN Charter.^[137]

More recent examples of state practice include the shootdown of a Turkish RF-4E Phantom reconnaissance aircraft by Syrian forces in June 2012 and the shootdown of a U.S. MQ-4C Triton surveillance drone in 2019. In the case of the Turkish aircraft, Syrian authorities claimed that the reconnaissance plane was illegally collecting intelligence from within its national airspace.^[138] Similarly, Iranian authorities claimed that the U.S. drone was shot down over the Persian Gulf because it was collecting intelligence in Iran’s national airspace.^[139]

Five States—Cambodia, China, Sudan, Syria, and Vietnam—illegally claim “security” jurisdiction in their contiguous zone.^[140] These claims are inconsistent with the negotiating history of the Convention, which rejects that coastal States retain residual competencies (like security jurisdiction) beyond the territorial sea.^[141] They are also inconsistent with a plain reading of article 33. The contiguous zone is a law enforcement zone. Within the zone, coastal State jurisdiction is limited to exercising the control necessary to prevent and punish infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea.^[142] 

Claims of authority to regulate ISR in the EEZ are also misplaced. Within the EEZ, coastal States enjoy sovereign rights for the limited purpose of “exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing” living and non-living natural resources, as well as jurisdiction over resource-related off-shore installations and structures, marine scientific research (MSR), and protection and preservation of the marine environment.^[143] Coastal States do not, however, exercise sovereignty in the EEZ, as confirmed by article 89 of UNCLOS.^[144] Although the EEZ is a sui generis zone,^[145] article 86 makes clear that nothing in the article abridges the non-resource-related high seas “freedoms enjoyed by all States in the EEZ in accordance with Article 58.”^[146] Thus, the Convention retains the distinction for the EEZ that had previously existed between the high seas, which are open to all States, and the territorial sea, where the coastal State exercises sovereignty.

Some States, including China, argue that military activities, including ISR, are inconsistent with the “peaceful purposes” provisions of UNCLOS. Such an interpretation is not supported by a plain reading of the Convention, the deliberations of the Security Council, or long-standing State practice. Article 301 requires that States “refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.”^[147] This language mirrors the text of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits armed aggression in international relations between States.^[148] 

UNCLOS clearly distinguishes between activities that are considered a “threat or use of force” and other activities, such as intelligence collection, which are not. Article 19(2)(a) repeats the language of Article 301, prohibiting ships in innocent passage from engaging in “any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal State.”^[149] Article 19(2)(c) prohibits ships engaged in innocent passage from “collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal State.”^[150] This differentiation clearly demonstrates that UNCLOS does not equate the “threat or use of force” with intelligence collection or other peacetime military activities. Rather, the test of whether a military activity (like ISR operations) is “peaceful” is determined by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and other obligations under international law, including the inherent right of self-defense, reflected in Article 51 of the Charter.^[151]

  Most commentators that have addressed this issue agree that “based on various provisions of the Convention . . . it is logical . . . to interpret the peaceful . . . purposes clauses as prohibiting only those activities which are not consistent with the UN Charter.”^[152] These experts conclude that the peaceful purposes clauses in the Convention “do not prohibit all military activities on the high seas and in EEZs, but only those that threaten or use force in a manner inconsistent with the UN Charter.”^[153]

Whether peacetime ISR constitutes an act of aggression was specifically addressed by the Security Council in the 1960s. After the Soviet Union shot down an American U-2 spy plane near Sverdlovsk in May 1960, efforts by the Soviets to  have a Security Council resolution adopted that would have labelled the U-2 flights as “acts of aggression” under the Charter were rejected by a vote of seven to two (with two abstentions), thereby confirming that peacetime ISR collection (even in national airspace) does not violate the UN Charter.^[154] Four months later, Soviet forces shot down another American spy plane over the Barents Sea off the Kola Peninsula. The United States claimed that the RB-47 surveillance aircraft was operating in international airspace. The Soviets alleged that the aircraft was within its national airspace when it was engaged.^[155] Nevertheless, Soviet efforts to have the Security Council designate the U.S. surveillance flight an act of aggression once again failed by a vote of nine to two.^[156]

A similar conclusion is reflected in a 1985 Report of the Secretary-General on the Study of the Naval Arms Race. The report notes that the Convention declares that “the high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes,” but does not define the term.^[157] Nonetheless, the Convention provides an answer when it declares in Article 301 that in exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention, States Parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.^[158] Thus, the report concludes that “military activities which are consistent with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, in particular with Article 2, paragraph 4, and Article 51, are not prohibited by the Convention on the Law of the Sea.”^[159]

Efforts by a handful of States to limit military activities in the EEZ were rejected by a majority of the States participating in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).^[160]6 The overwhelming majority of States agreed that “military operations, exercises and activities have always been regarded as internationally lawful uses of the sea” and that the “right to conduct such activities will continue to be enjoyed by all States” in the EEZ.^[161] Bottom line, seaward of the territorial sea and national airspace, all States have the absolute right under international law to conduct ISR operations.

12. As maritime security challenges grow more complex, do you envision the emergence of a specialised “law of maritime security operations,” or will the field continue to draw fragmentarily from naval warfare law, law-enforcement norms, and customary practice?

There is no need for a new specialized law for MSOs. Such operations are peacetime constabulary operations that are already regulated by treaty law, state practice, judicial opinion, and domestic laws and policies on the use of force. The law of naval warfare only applies during an international armed conflict (and to a limited degree to non-international armed conflicts), but does not apply to MSOs.

References

[1]* The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the United States Department of War, the United States Navy, or the United States Naval War College.

 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 191, 247 (June 27).

[2] Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶¶ 51, 64 (Nov. 6).

[3] Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 Military Law Review 89, 92–94 (1989) (The United States has “always construed the phrase ‘armed attack’ in a reasonable manner, consistent with a customary practice that enables any State effectively to protect itself and its citizens from every illegal use of force aimed at the State.”); Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual §§ 1.11.5, 1.11.5.2 (rev. ed. July 2023) [hereinafter DoD Law of War Manual (2023)].

[4] William H. Taft IV, Legal Adviser, Department of State, Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 Yale Journal of International Law 295, 300-1 (2004)

[5] Bheemanagouda M Patil, Water Cannons: More Lethal Than You Think!, Defence XP (Sept. 12, 2024), https://www.defencexp.com/water-cannons-more-lethal-than-you-think/#google_vignette.

[6] Andrew Erickson, Fact Sheet: The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM), The Maritime Executive (Apr. 30, 2019), https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/fact-sheet-the-people-s-armed-forces-maritime-militia-pafmm.

[7] Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, Demystifying China’s Gray Zone Aggression: Water Cannons, Ramming, and the Use of Force, Small Wars Journal (Aug. 6, 2025), https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/08/06/demystifying-chinas-gray-zone-aggression/.

[8] Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/ reports/a_56_10.pdf. [hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility].

[9]  Id., art. 2.

[10] Id., art. 12.

[11] Id., art. 4.

[12] Id., art. 5.

[13] Id., art. 8.

[14]  Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defence art. 22 (adopted by the Eighth Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 1997); Military Service Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 4 (amended by the Ninth Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1998); People’s Republic of China Militia Work Regulations arts. 2, 3(3), 5 (amended by Order No. 588 of the State Council on Jan. 8, 2011).

[15] The South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, Award, ¶¶ 649–814, 1044–1109 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016) [hereinafter South China Sea Arbitration]. 

[16] Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct. 20, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459, 1050 U.N.T.S. 16. 

[17] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].

[18] Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 8, arts. 28, 49.

[19] Id., art. 31.

[20] Id., art. 34.

[21] Id., art. 35.

[22] Id., art. 36.

[23] Id., art. 38.

[24] Id., art. 37.

[25] Id., arts. 50-51.

[26] Id. art. 22 (“The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation towards another State is precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes a countermeasure taken against the latter State in accordance with Chapter II of Part Three.”).

[27] Pedrozo, supra note 7.

[28] Iran's Spy Ship Activity Extends Beyond the Red Sea, The Maritime Executive (Jan. 12, 2025), https://maritime-executive.com/article/iran-s-spy-ship-activity-extends-beyond-the-red-sea.

[29] Id.

[30] Newport Manual on the Law of Naval Operations (2d ed.)  § 8.6.3, 105 International Law Studies 1 (2025) [hereinafter Newport Manual (2025)].

[31] Law of the People's Republic of China on National Defense Transportation Order of the President of the People's Republic of China (No. 50) (adopted by the Twelfth Nat’l People's Cong., Sept. 3, 2016).

[32] J. Michael Dahm, China Maritime Report No. 35: Beyond Chinese Ferry Tales: The Rise of Deck Cargo Ships in China's Military Activities, 2023 (2024), CMSI China Maritime Reports 35.

[33] ​Christopher McFaddenn, China’s hidden container missile system could take down US jets in surprise attack, Interesting Engineering (June 17, 2025), https://interestingengineering.com/innovation/china-container-missile-system; T. X. Hammes & R. Robinson Harris, Warship Weapons for Merchant Ship Platforms U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings Vol. 151/2/1,464 (Feb. 2025), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2025/february/warship-weapons-merchant-ship-platforms; In 2022, China Unveiled Its Copy of Russia's Club-K Missile System, Now It Threatens US Navy, Defense Express (June 12, 2025), https://en.defence-ua.com/news/in_2022_china_unveiled_its_copy_of_russias_club_k_missile_system_now_it_threatens_us_navy-14827.html.

[34] Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, The Law and Containerized Missile and Rocket Launch Systems, Lawfire (Aug. 21, 2025), https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2025/08/21/pete-pedrozo-on-the-law-and-containerized-missile-and-rocket-launch-systems/.

[35] Newport Manual (2025), supra note 30, §§ 1.1, 5.4.1, 8.8.1.

[36] Memorandum from Lincoln P. Bloomfield, National Security Council Staff to Zbigniew Brzezinski, U.S. National Security Advisor (July 31, 1979).

[37] President Ronald Reagan, Statement on United States Oceans Policy (Mar. 10, 1983).

[38] Australia, FONOPs and the South China Sea, United States Studies Centre (July 29, 2020), https://www.ussc.edu.au/australia-fonops-and-the-south-china-sea; Colin Clark, Australia, Canada, the Philippines, and US mount South China Sea FONOP, Breaking Defense (Aug. 7 2024), https://breakingdefense.com/2024/08/australia-canada-the-philippines-and-us-mount-south-china-sea-fonop/; Sebastian Strangio, UK, Australia Conduct Freedom of Navigation Operation in South China Sea, The Diplomat (June 26, 2025), https://thediplomat.com/2025/06/uk-australia-conduct-freedom-of-navigation-operation-in-south-china-sea/; Lisa West, British warship ignores Chinese warnings in South China Sea, UK Defence Journal (May 17, 2025), https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/british-warship-ignores-chinese-warnings-in-south-china-sea/.

[39] Ryan Chan, US’s NATO and Pacific Allies Sail Warships Near China’s Coast, Newsweek (June 20, 2025), https://www.newsweek.com/uk-japan-news-navies-ships-taiwan-strait-transit-china-2088199; Lucy Craymer, Ben Blanchard & Yimou Lee, New Zealand navy encountered Taiwan warship during strait transit last month, Reuters (Dec. 8, 2025), https://www.reuters.com/world/china/new-zealand-navy-encountered-taiwan-warship-during-strait-transit-last-month-2025-12-09/; Joe Keary, Which Countries Challenge China’s Claim to the Taiwan Strait?, Real Clear Defense (Sept. 16, 2024), https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/09/16/which_countries_challenge_chinas_claim_to_the_taiwan_strait_1058438.html#google_vignette;

[40] Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 8, art. 22. (“The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation towards another State is precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes a countermeasure taken against the latter State in accordance with Chapter II of Part Three.”).

[41] South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, Award, ¶¶ 1090-1109, 1203(B)(15) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016) [hereinafter South China Sea Arbitration]. (The Tribunal found that blocking and harassment maneuvers conducted by CCG vessels “created serious risk of collision and danger to Philippine ships and personnel; and . . . that China’s operation of its law enforcement vessels . . . violated Rules 2, 6, 7, 8, 15, and 16 . . . [COLREGS]” and “breached its obligations under Article 94 of the Convention.”)

[42] UNCLOS, supra note 17, arts. 92, 94.

[43] The Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Risk index 2023 Update (Dec. 2023), 3, 5, 30-32, 61-64, 113 [hereinafter IUU Fishing Index], https://www.iuufishingindex.net/downloads/IUU-Report-2023.pdf.

[44] Miren Gutiérrez et al., China’s Distant-Water Fishing Fleet: Scale, Impact and Governance 8, 9, 15 (June 2020), [hereinafter ODI Report (2020)], https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/chinesedistantwaterfishing_web.pdf.

[45] OCEANA Report, Looking Beyond the Horizon: China's Intense Fishing Efforts Threaten Galápagos Islands and Global Seafood Supply Chain (Dec. 2023), 1, [hereinafter OCEANA Report (2023)], https://usa.oceana.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2023/12/Looking-Beyond-the-Horizon-Report-2.pdf.

[46] Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, China’s IUU Fishing Fleet: Pariah of the World’s Oceans, 99 International Law Studies 319 (2024).

[47] U.S. Coast Guard, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Strategic Outlook (Sept. 2020), 14 [hereinafter USCG Strategic Outlook (2020)], https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/iuu/IUU_Strategic_Outlook_20 20_FINAL.pdf.

[48] IUU Fishing Index, supra note 43, 59.

[49] UNCLOS, supra note 17, art. 107.

[50] Id., art. 110.

[51] Id., arts. 95, 96.

[52] Id., art. 31

[53] Id., art. 32.

[54] S/RES/665 (1990) (25 August 1990).

[55] Newport Manual, supra note 30, §§ 8.5.1; 8.6.1, 11.3.2.1.

[56] Id., § 10.4.

[57] Raunek, 18 Anti-Piracy Weapons for Ships to Fight Pirates, Marine Insight (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.marineinsight.com/marine-piracy-marine/18-anti-piracy-weapons-for -ships-to-fight-pirates/.

[58] Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of December 10, 1982, relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, with annexes, Aug. 4, 1995, T.I.A.S. 01-1211, 2167 U.N.T.S. 3. (Article 22 provides that the boarding party should “avoid the use of force except when and to the degree necessary to ensure the safety of the inspectors and where the inspectors are obstructed in the execution of their duties” and requires that “the degree of force used shall not exceed that reasonably required in the circumstances.”).

[59] Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Rome March 10, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 672 (1988), 1678 UNTS 221, [hereinafter SUA 1988], and Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, London Oct. 14, 2005, IMO Doc. SUA.3/Circ.11, May 4, 2010, [hereinafter SUA 2005]. (Article 8bis provides if force is used by the boarding party, it “shall not exceed the minimum degree of force . . . necessary and reasonable in the circumstances.”).

[60] The United States has entered into over 40 bilateral agreements, arrangements, and procedures with partner nations to facilitate the interdiction and boarding of vessels suspected of trafficking illicit drugs by sea. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fiscal Year 2020 Report to Congress, Counter-Drug Operations, Aug. 14, 2020, 6.

[61] Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Colombia to Suppress Illicit Traffic by Sea art. 12, Feb. 20, 1997, T.I.A.S. 12835. (Article 12 provides that “law enforcement officials shall avoid the use of force . . ., including the use of firearms,” when conducting boardings and searches, except in the exercise of the right of self-defense” and if force is used by the boarding party, it will be “the minimum reasonably necessary and proportional under the circumstances.”).

[62] United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, with Annex and Final Act, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95. (Article 17 calls on states to enter “into bilateral or regional agreements or arrangements” to enhance the effective interdiction of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances at sea.).

[63] Agreement Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials by Sea arts. 4, 9, Aug. 4, 2005, Oct. 19, 2005, T.I.A.S. 05-1019. (The agreement with Belize provides in article 4 that if force is used by the boarding party, it must be “reasonably necessary.”).

[64] PSI participating States are encouraged to enter into bilateral agreements or operational arrangements to facilitate cooperation and boarding of suspect ships. The United States has entered into 11 bilateral ship-boarding agreements that provide the parties authority to board and search foreign-flagged vessels on the high seas suspected of carrying WMD-related materials. The United States has agreements with Panama (2004), the Marshall Islands (2004), Liberia (2004), Croatia (2005), Cyprus 2005), Belize (2005), Malta (2007), Mongolia (2007), the Bahamas (2008), Antigua and Barbuda (2010), and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (2010).

[65] U.S. Department of State, Sttement of Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative, Sept. 4, 2003.

[66] S.S. I’m Alone (Can. v. U.S.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1609 (1935).

[67] Red Crusader (U.K. v. Den.), 29 I.L.R. 521 (Comm’n of Enquiry 1962).

[68] M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Judgment of July 1, 1999, 2 ITLOS Rep. 72.

[69] The M/V Virginia G Case (Panama/Guinea-Bissau), Judgment of April 14, 2014, ITLOS Reports, p. 4.

[70] G.A. Res. 34/169, Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, Dec. 17, 1979 [hereinafter UN Code of Conduct]. (Article 3 and its comment authorizes the use of force “only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their duty.” Any use of force must therefore be “reasonably necessary under the circumstances for the prevention of crime or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest” of a suspected offender. If the use of force is unavoidable, it shall be proportionate to the “seriousness of the offense and legitimate objective to be achieved.”).

[71] Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1, at 112 (Aug. 27 – Sept. 7, 1990) [hereinafter UN Basic Principles on Use of Force]. (Paragraph 5 provides that if the use of force or firearms is unavoidable, law enforcement officials shall exercise restraint and use only that amount of force that is proportionate “to the seriousness of the offence and the legitimate objective to be achieved.” If the use of force or firearms is necessary, officers shall “minimize damage and injury, and respect and preserve human life.”).

[72] United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, Maritime Crime: A Manual for Criminal Justice Practitioners (2017). (Paragraph 62 provides that the level of force that can be used to execute such missions must not exceed the minimum reasonably necessary in the circumstances.).

[73] Newport Manual (2025), supra note 30, § 6.4; Abdujalil Abdurasulov, Ukraine War: The Sea Drones Keeping Russia’s Warships at Bay, BBC News (Mar. 12, 2024), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68528761; Nick Paton Walsh, Victoria Butenko, & Florence Davey-Attlee, The Moment Ukraine Used an Experimental Drone to Attack a Russian Bridge, CNN (Aug. 15, 2023), https://www.cnn.com/ 2023/08/15/europe/ukraine-crimea-bridge-drone-strike-video-intl/index.html.

[74] IMO, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on Its One Hundredth and Seventh Session ¶ 5.22, IMO Doc. MSC 107/20 (June 26, 2023); IMO, Report of the MSCLEG-FAL Joint Working Group on Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) on its First Session, IMO Doc. LEG 110/11 (Dec. 23, 2022).

[75] See U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of the Secretary, SECNAV Instruction 5030.8D, General Guidance for the Classification of Naval Vessels and Battle Force Ship Counting Procedures (2022) [hereinafter SECNAVINST 5030.8D]. (Enclosure 4 provides that “umanned maritime vessels and vehicles are platforms designed to operate remotely, independently or integrated with manned platforms. These systems may possess varying degrees of autonomy, as specified by the platform and system level requirements. . . . Certain unmanned maritime vehicles may, in the future, be part of the battle force inventory . . . . Testing of these platforms and their concepts of employment continue to evolve. When these platforms are deemed capable of contributing to combat operations, the CNO will recommend their reclassification and inclusion in the battle force count [as warships] for SECNAV approval.”). The UK takes a similar position. UK Royal Navy unmanned vessels (over 20) are currently listed as auxiliaries in the experimentation section of the UK Defence Shipping Register, but with the aspiration that they be classified as warships where appropriate once the capabilities under experimentation are proven. See oral evidence of Commander Caroline Tuckett to the UK House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee given on Nov. 10, 2021, https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/3000/pdf/.

[76] Newport Manual, supra note 30, § 3.2.1.

[77] Id., § 3.2.1.

[78] Muscat Dhows (Fr./Gr. Brit.), Case No. 1904-01, Award, at 93, 96 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1905).

[79] UNCLOS, supra note 17, art. 91.

[80] UNCLOS, supra note 17, art. 19.

[81] Id., art. 25.

[82] Id., art. 30.

[83] James Kraska & Raul Pedrozo, The Free Sea: The American Fight for Freedom of Navigation, Naval Institute Press (2018), ch. 8, 10, 11.

[84] See U.S. Naval War College, Maritime Operational Zones app. C (Dennis Mandsager et al. eds., 2013), [hereinafter Zones Manual] https://dnnlgwick.blob.core.windows.net/portals/0/NWCDepartments/Stockton%20Ce nter%20International%20Law/2013-Zones-Manual.pdf?sr=b&si=DNNFileManagerPolicy&sig=sWrSUKeqZaEKhaVvWPx0bCSByt6FQnC6k3YHkszLx9I%3D; Fatima Bahtić, Russian Navy’s Operations Restrict Shipping in Sea of Azov Amid Conflict with Ukraine, NavalToday.com (Feb. 24, 2022), https://www.navaltoday.com/2022/02/24/russian-navys-operations-restrict-shipping-in-sea-of-azov-amid-conflict-with-ukraine/; Message from Duty Officer, Navigation Warning Service, Dep’t of Navigation and Oceanography, Russia, [hereinafter Russia Navigation Warning Service], https://gcaptain.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Russian-gmdss-warning.jpg.

[85] Newport Manual (2025), supra note 30, § 7.2.1; DoD Law of War Manual, supra note 3, § 13.9.

[86] Zones Manual, supra note 38.

[87] Id.

[88] Id.

[89] Id.

[90] Bahtić, supra note 36; Russia Navigation Warning Service, supra note 36.

[91] Id.

[92] U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps & U.S. Coast Guard, NWP 1-14M/MCTP 1110B/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations app. A (2022) [hereinafter NWP 1-14M (2022)].

[93] Id., § 7.9.

[94] DoD Law of War Manual, supra note 3, § 13.9.2.

[95] Id., § 13.9.4.

[96] NWP 1-14M (2022), supra note 92, § 7.9.

[97] Newport Manual (2025), supra note 30, §§ 7.2.1.1, 7.2.1.2, 7.2.1.3.

[98] Prescriptive jurisdiction refers to the authority of a State to create and establish laws and regulations that govern a particular subject matter or activity.

[99] Enforcement jurisdiction refers to the authority of a State to enforce laws and regulations within a specific geographic area or over a particular group of people.

[100] The “protective principle” of international law refers to the jurisdiction a State may exercise in respect of persons, property or events abroad that may constitute a threat to its essential interests, including acts against national security.

[101] Shamim Chowdhury, At Least 11 Baltic Cables Sabotaged in 15 Months: What to Know, Newsweek (Jan. 28, 2025), https://www.newsweek.com/least-11-baltic-cables-sabotaged-15-months-what-know-2021972.

[102] Jaime Ocon & Jonathan Walberg, China’s Undersea Cable Sabotage and Taiwan’s Digital Vulnerabilities, Global Taiwan Brief, Vol. 10, Iss. 11, Global Taiwan Institute (June 2025), https://globaltaiwan.org/2025/06/taiwans-digital-vulnerabilities/.

[103] Henri van Soest & Harper Fine, Commentary: Vital Yet Vulnerable: Undersea Infrastructure Needs Better Protection, RAND (Mar. 11, 2024), https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/ 2024/03/vital-yet-vulnerable-undersea-infrastructure-needs.html; Submarine Cables, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (last updated Mar. 5, 2024), https: //www.noaa.gov/submarine-cables.

[104] Coastal and archipelagic States exercise sovereignty over the territorial sea and archipelagic waters. UNCLOS, supra note 17, arts. 2, 21(1)(c), 49, 79(4).

[105] Id., art. 113.

[106] The Telecommunications Act, 2023

[107] Id., § 1(2).

[108] Id., § 22(3).

[109] Id., § 42.

[110] Id. § 50.

[111] The Coast Guard Act, 1978.

[112] UNCLOS, supra note 17, art. 92,

[113] Newport Manual, supra note 30, §§ 8.5.1; 8.6.1, 11.3.2.1.

[114] Id., § 10.4.

[115] Newport Manual, supra note 30, § 6.5; NWP 1-14M (2022), supra note 92, § 13.11.1.

[116] Contact mines detonate on contact with a target. Influence mines may be detonated through pressure, acoustics (broad and narrow band), magnetic signatures, electrical fields, or ship count (remaining inactive until a certain number of contacts have passed or until a particular target signature is detected). Jane’s, Mines and Depth Charges (Oct. 6, 2017).

[117] Convention No. VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2332, T.S. No. 541.

[118] Id., art. 1(1).

[119] Id., art. 1(2).

[120] Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, Russia-Ukraine Conflict:  The War at Sea, 100 International Law Studies 1, 32-9 (2023).

[121] Alison Bath, US military and allies have found over 100 mines in the Black Sea, Navy says,

Stars and Stripes (Sept. 11, 2024), https://www.stripes.com/theaters/europe/2024-09-11/sea-mines-russia-ukraine-15140456.html.

[122] Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 49(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Newport Manual, supra note 30, § 8.1.

[123] NWP 1-14M (2022), supra note 92, § 8.11.2; DoD Law of War Manual, supra note 3, § 16.2.1.

[124] Newport Manual, supra note 30, § 8.1.4.

[125] Id.

[126] Newport Manual, supra note 30, § 8.6.3.

[127] Newport Manual, supra note 30, § 8.6.5.

[128] UNCLOS, supra note 17, art. 2; Convention on International Civil Aviation arts. 1–2, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, Dec. 7, 1944 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].

[129] UNCLOS, supra note 17, art. 19(2)(c).

[130] Chicago Convention, supra note 128, art. 3(c).

[131] Babara Kwiatkowska, The 200 Mile Exclusive Economic Zone in the New Law of the Sea 203 (1989).

[132] Id., annex 11 ¶ 2.1.2.

[133] Id., art. 3; U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Instruction 4540.01, Use of International Airspace by U.S. Military Aircraft and for Missile and Projectile Firings ¶ 3.c(2)(b), (incorporating change 1, May 22, 2017) [hereinafter DoDI 4540.01].

[134] Center for Cryptologic History, Dedication and Sacrifice: National Aerial Reconnaissance in the Cold War, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/13/2002761784/-1/-1/0/DEDICATION-SACRIFICE.PDF.

[135] Oliver J. Lissitzyn, The Role of International Law and an Evolving Oceans Law, 61 International Law Studies 563, 566–67, 574–75, 578–79 (1980); Samuel J. Cox, H-029-3: A Brief History of U.S. Navy Cold War Aviation Incidents (Excluding Korea and Vietnam), Naval History and Heritage Command (Apr. 2019), https://www.history.navy.mil/con tent/history/nhhc/about-us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram 029/h-029-3.html.

[136] U.N. SCOR, 9th Sess., 680th mtg., U.N. Doc. S./P.V.680, ¶ 125 (Sept. 10, 1954).

[137] U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 881st mtg., U.N. Doc. S./P.V.881, ¶ 64 (July 25, 1960).

[138] Eric Schmitt & Sebnem Arsu, Backed By NATO, Turkey Steps Up Warning To Syria, New York Times (June 26, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/world/mid dleeast/turkey-seeks-nato-backing-in-syria-dispute.html.

[139] Richard Sisk, Iran Chose to Take Out Drone Instead of Manned Navy Jet, Iranian General Says, Military.com (June 21, 2019), https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/06/21/iran-chose-take-out-drone-instead manned-navy-jet-lranian-general-says.html; Iran’s IRGC Force Shoots Down Intruding US Spy Drone, PRESSTV (June 20, 2019), https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2019/06/20/5989 42/Iran-IRGC-US-spy-drone.

[140] U.S. Department of Defense, Maritime Claims Reference Manual, [hereinafter MCRM], http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/code_10_mcrm.htm (last updated Feb. 8, 2022).

[141] II UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 529–30 (Satya N. Nandan & Shabtai Rosenne eds., 1993) [hereinafter VIRGINIA COMMENTARY II].

[142] UNCLOS, supra note 17, art. 33.

[143] Id., art. 56.

[144] Id., arts. 56(2), 89. Article 89 (“no state may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty”) applies to the EEZ pursuant to article 56(2) (Articles 88-115 apply to the EEZ in so far as they are not incompatible with Part V). See also VIRGINIA COMMENTARY II, supra note 141, 531–44; JAMES KRASKA & RAUL PEDROZO, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY LAW 233 (2013).

[145] UNCLOS, supra note 17, art. 86.

[146] Id.; III UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COM MENTARY 60–71 (Satya N. Nandan & Shabtai Rosenne eds., 1995) [hereinafter VIRGINIA COMMENTARY III].

[147] UNCLOS, supra note 17, art. 301 (“In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention, States Parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations”).

[148] U.N. Charter art. 2(4) (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”).

[149] UNCLOS, supra note 17, art. 19(2)(a).

[150] Id., art. 19(2)(c).

[151] VIRGINIA COMMENTARY III, supra note 146, at 89–91; 5 THIRD UN CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 67TH PLENARY MEETING, OFFICIAL RECORDS 62, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.67 (Apr. 23, 1976); Bernard H. Oxman, The Regime of Warships under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 24 Virginia Journal of International Law 809, 829–32 (1984).

[152] Moritaka Hayashi, Military and Intelligence Gathering Activities in the EEZ: Definition of Key Terms, 29 Marine Policy 123 (2005).

[153] Id.

[154] U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 857th mtg. ¶ 99, U.N. Doc. S/PV.857 (May 23, 1960) (text of USSR’s draft resolution); U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 860th mtg., ¶ 87, U.N. Doc. S/PV.860 (May 26, 1960) (result of voting on draft resolution).

[155] Cable Dated 13 July 1960 From the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. S/4384 (July 13, 1960).

[156] U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 883d mtg., ¶ 187, U.N. Doc. S/PV.883 and Add.1 (July 26, 1960).

[157] U.N. Secretary-General, Study on the Naval Arms Race, U.N. Doc. A/40/535, annex ¶ 188 (Sept. 17, 1985) [hereinafter UN Study on the Naval Arms Race].

[158] Id.

[159] Id.

[160] VIRGINIA COMMENTARY II, supra note 141, 529–30.

[161] 17 THIRD UN CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, PLENARY MEETINGS, OF FICIAL RECORDS 244, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WS/37 and ADD.1–2 (1984) [hereinafter OFFICIAL RECORDS vol. 17]; UN Study on the Naval Arms Race, supra note 157, ¶ 188.